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Abstract
The doctrine of patentable subject matter precludes basic inventions such as ab-
stract ideas and laws of nature from patent protection. However, current economic
thinking of the patent system stresses the necessity of rewarding pioneering inventors
in the cumulative innovation process. In a two-stage innovation model where the first
stage invention (basic invention) has no stand-alone value and the pioneer can also
participate in the second stage, I show that patent protection to the basic invention
may increase rather than hamper the second stage performance. Rejecting patents
on the basic invention can promote technology progress when the pioneer has high
capacity, but the follower has low capacity to engage in the second stage innovation.
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1 Introduction
In the past two decades, we’ve witnessed a paradigm shift in the economic under-
standing of the patent system. Economists have departed from the discrete innova-
tion environment (Nordhaus, 1969, Gilbert and Shapiro, 1990, Klemperer, 1990), and
appreciate that R&D is a continual process where each discovery opens a door for
future research and each invention builds on knowledge previously acquired in the
same or adjacent fields (Green and Scotchmer, 1995, Scotchmer, 1996, O’Donoghue,
1998, Denicolo`, 2000, Bessen and Maskin, 2009). Reflecting its sequential nature, the
literature of cumulative innovation emphasizes the needs to properly protect early
stage inventions, and focuses on how to adjust patent rights to latter inventions in
order to balance R&D incentives at different stages of the innovation process.1
Patent law does not always enthusiastically embrace the strong support of basic
inventions, however. The Supreme Court of the United States has long held that “[h]e
who discovers a hitherto unknown phenomenon of nature has no claim to a monopoly of it
which the law recognizes. If there is to be invention from such a discovery, it must come from
the application of the law of nature to a new and useful end.”2 Established in case law, the
doctrine of patentable subject matter (henceforth, the DPSM) precludes the following
from the realm of patent protection:3
principles, laws of nature, mental processes, intellectual concepts, ideas,
natural phenomena, mathematical formulae, methods of calculation, fun-
damental truths, original causes, motives, [and] the Pythagorean theorem. . . .
Applications of abstract ideas and principles, instead, may be patented, provided that
they also satisfy other requirements such as novelty, non-obviousness, and usefulness.
Understanding laws of nature or discovering new ideas very often entail substan-
tial knowledge spillover as they provide new and fertile grounds for future research.
These activities arguably require no less time and effort than designing applications
from basic concepts. The DPSM seems at odds with the insights from cumulative
1See Scotchmer (2004) for a literature review. Bessen and Maskin (2009) argues that the patent system
should be abolished in the cumulative innovation environment.
2Funk Bros. Seed Co. vs. Kalo Inoculand Co., 333 U.S. 127 (1948).
3In re Bergy, 596 F.2d 952, 201 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 352 (C.C.P.A. 1979). See also Merges (1997). The European
Patent Convention excludes the following from patentable inventions: (a) discoveries, scientific theories
and mathematical methods; (b) aesthetic creations; (c) schemes, rules and methods for performing mental
acts, playing games or doing business, and programs for computers; and (d) presentations of information
(http://www.epo.org/patents/law/legal-texts/html/epc/1973/e/ar52.html).
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innovation theory (Eisenberg, 2000). For sure, one may find other justifications for
the DPSM, such as the difficulty to enforce patent rights based on abstract ideas or
mental process, or the somewhat ambiguous difference between “discovery” and “in-
vention.”4 Since the patent system is designed to “promote the Progress of Science
and useful Arts,”5 in this paper I address the discrepancy between economic theory
and paten law practice from the point of view of innovation incentives. I ask: In order
to promote technological progress, when is it optimal to enable the DPSM and deny
patent protection to basic inventions?
Consider a two-stage innovation process, where the completion of the first stage
is a pre-requisite to start the second stage (Green and Scotchmer, 1995). At the first
stage, a pioneering inventor aims to create, or discover, an abstract idea. The abstract
idea has no stand-alone value; further efforts are required to find practical applica-
tions of the idea. At the second stage, the pioneer and a following inventor sequen-
tially search for the same application. I let the pioneer search first, and the follower
search only when the pioneer does not come up with the application. To focus on the
DPSM, I assume that the application is always patentable, and will always infringe
on the abstract idea should the latter become patentable. The only policy instrument
is the degree of patent protection conferred to the abstract idea.
To raise the overall innovation rate, i.e., the probability that the application will
be discovered,6 I find that the DPSM is more likely to be optimal when, at the second
stage, the pioneer has better search capacity, while the follower is less likely to make
the discovery, i.e., when his search cost is more likely to be large and so the probabil-
ity to incur the cost and find the application is small. Consistent with the literature,
granting a patent on the abstract idea boosts the pioneer’s first stage innovation incen-
tives and alters the follower’s search decision. This policy also reduces the pioneer’s
search incentives at the second stage: if she does not invent the application, she can
still use the patent rights on the abstract idea to get a share of the follower’s expected
surplus. Therefore, besides considering incentives of different generations of inven-
4In Gottschalk vs. Benson, 409 U.S. 63 (1972), the Supreme Court states that: “It is conceded that one
may not patent an idea.. . . The mathematical formula involved here has no substantial practical application except in
connection with a digital computer, which means that if the judgment below is affirmed, the patent would wholly
preempt the mathematical formula and in practical effect would be a patent on the algorithm itself.” This argument
could be analyzed as one with patent scope, i.e., whether to allow a patent with a very broad scope such
that it covers all inventions using the algorithm.
5U.S. Constitution, Art I, sect. 8, cl. 8.
6In Section 4, I show that the DPSM is not optimal when using the two inventors’ joint surplus as the
policy objective.
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tors, there is a need to balance the same inventor’s incentives at different innovation
stages. This concern dominates as the pioneer’s second stage capacity improves, but
the follower’s capacity deteriorates. When the follower has a rather small probability
to find the application (even without the threat from the patent on the abstract idea),
there is not much surplus to transfer from the follower to the pioneer. Patenting the
abstract idea has limited benefit on the first stage innovation, and the second stage
discovery probability is dominated by the pioneer’s performance. When the pioneer
can find the application with a significant probability, provided that she is willing to do
so, the negative effect of such an “early reward” on her search decision can be non-
negligible. The DPSM then is justified as a way to preserve the pioneer’s continuing
efforts in research.
This result implies that abstract ideas or basic inventions should not be patentable
if great first-mover advantage can be derived from engaging in fundamental research,
while a new comer, lacking the experience at the earlier stage, faces a substantial ob-
stacle to join the rank. But as the innovation process becomes more “democratic,” i.e.,
as knowledge and research capacity disseminate and are no longer concentrated on a
few “early stars,” then it would be optimal to start patenting abstract ideas or early in-
ventions. Alternatively, the pioneering inventor’s and following inventor’s capacity
may be different in kind. The pioneer may be good at perfecting the basic invention
or better understanding its fundamental properties, and follower may have advan-
tage in identifying particular use of the basic invention and adapting it to specific
contexts. The relative importance of these two capacities then depends on the phase
of technological progress. To the extent that further understanding the basic scien-
tific principles has priority in primitive technology fields, basic inventions or abstract
ideas should become patentable only in mature fields.
An interesting feature of this model is that strengthening the patent protection
to the basic invention does not necessarily hamper the second stage innovation. Al-
though it weakens the pioneer’s search incentives, there are two opposite effects on
the follower’s search incentives. A negative effect is the direct concern to share the
fruits with the pioneer. But when the application may exist only with a probability,
a lower search intensity from the pioneer will boost the follower’s search incentives.
The positive effect comes from an information channel in the sequential search struc-
ture, and the assumption that an inventor’s search cost is private information. Since
the follower searches only if the pioneer hasn’t found the application yet, the latter’s
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“silence” delivers a bad news about the existence of the application, and the more so
the more intensively the pioneer searches. Along the equilibrium path, the pioneer’s
lower search effort after obtaining a patent on the basic invention will raise the fol-
lowing inventor’s updated belief when it is his turn to search. The direct negative
effect is mitigated by the boost in belief. This positive effect may be strong enough to
raise the overall second-stage performance after the patenting of abstract ideas. When
this is true, patenting the basic invention is beneficial to both stages of innovation. A
necessary condition for the DPSM to be optimal, then, is that it has to enhance the
second-stage innovation probability.
This finding provides another interpretation of the shrinking of the DPSM since
the 1980s. Through a series of court decisions, particularly in computer software and
biotechnology, the scope of patentable subject matters has drastically increased in the
U.S. (Kuhn, 2007). Despite rapid expansions, some commentators have warned that
rewarding patents to abstract ideas would do more harm than good to the long-term
development in these fields. And it is an often raised hypothesis that these industries
could have done better had these basic patents been denied.7 My result neverthe-
less suggests a less gloomy role of basic patents. It also implies that these patents
may promote the disintegration of the innovation market. The pioneer has lower
search incentives after obtaining a patent on the abstract idea. When the belief-based
positive effect substantially offsets the negative effect of rent transfer, the conditional
probability that the application is discovered by the follower increases, and so the
concentration of innovations falls after abolishing the DPSM. Furthermore, if the op-
timal patent policy takes into account the concerns in my analysis, then there may be
a reverse causality: abstract ideas and basic inventions become patentable precisely
when there is a better follower joining the development process.
There is a long and well established literature of the doctrine of patentable sub-
ject matter in the legal profession.8 In economics, however, most studies either as-
sume that early inventions always receive patent protection (Green and Scotchmer,
1995, Scotchmer, 1996, Denicolo`, 2000), or give equal treatments to innovations at
different stages (O’Donoghue, 1998). Matutes et al. (1996) and Kultti and Mittunen
(2008) allow various levels of protection to the basic invention, including no protec-
tion, but conclude that some protection is always better. To the best of my knowledge,
7See, e.g., Merges (2007) for a discussion of these “unfulfilling” critics in the software industry.
8See Merges (1997) for a general discussion. A partial list of recent articles includes Gruner (2007), Kuhn
(2007) and Risch (2008).
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Harhoff et al. (2001) and Aoki and Nagaoka (2004) are the two exceptions that obtain
no patent protection to the basic invention as the optimal policy. Assuming that firms
have fixed research capacity, Harhoff et al. (2001) cautions that patenting basic inven-
tions (gene in their model) may induce socially wasteful stockpile of basic inventions
and delay applications. Aoki and Nagaoka (2004) allow firms to vary R&D efforts and
is the most relevant paper to my analysis.9
Aoki and Nagaoka (2004) considers the same issue as here, namely, whether to
grant patent protection to an intermediate invention that serves only as an input for
future research, and obtains a pretty intuitive result that patent protection is desir-
able when conducting basic research is very costly. Aoki and Nagaoka (2004) adopts
a two-stage paten race model as in Denicolo` (2000), and assume that players have
the same Poisson-type innovation technology. In this paper, I stress the asymmetry
between inventors of different generations. I will also show that, when the first stage
innovation cost has uniform distribution, the optimality of theDPSMdoes not depend
on the cost parameter (the support of the distribution) at this stage. In this regard, my
analysis is complementary to the insight derived in Aoki and Nagaoka (2004).
To proceed, section 2 introduces the basic setting; section 3 considers how the
patent policy affects the innovation performance at each stage, whose results are ap-
plied in Section 4 to determine when it is optimal to enable the DPSM; section 5 (to be
completed) considers some variations of the basic model; and section 6 concludes the
paper. Proofs are collected in Appendix A.
2 Model
A pioneering inventor (pioneer, she) and a following inventor (follower, he) engage
in a two-stage innovation process. The goal of the first stage is to create a basic in-
9Aoki and Nagaoka (2004) considers the same issue as here but in the name of utility requirement. Ar-
guably there is some over-lapping between the utility requirement and the DPSM: an abstract idea is not
patentable because it lacks “specific and substantial utility,” i.e., it is not “useful for any particular practi-
cal purpose.” (See USPTO,Utility Examination Guidelines, http://www.uspto.gov/web/menu/utility.pdf.)
Indeed, in Brenner vs. Manson, 383 U.S. 519 (1966), the Supreme Court ruled that the Manson patent is
at a too preliminary stage to be protected by a patent, and stated that “a patent is not a hunting license. It
is not a reward for the search, but compensation for its successful conclusion.” The Court’s reasoning, however,
contains some flavor of patent scope: “Unless and until a process is refined and developed to this point–where
specific benefit exists in current available form–there is insufficient justification for permitting an applicant to engross
what may prove to be a broad field.” Risch (2008) suggests to abolish the DPSM but reinvigorate the utility
requirement to assess the patentability of each invention. In practice, the utility requirement is not strictly
applied. Few patent applications are rejected under this requirement.
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vention or scientific knowledge whose application is to be discovered at the second
stage. As in Matutes et al. (1996), I assume that only the pioneer participates in the
first stage, but both players may search for the application at the second-stage. To
compare my results with the cumulative innovation literature, I also assume that, at
the second stage, players are looking for the same application, or applications with
high substitutability in terms of payoffs.
An inventor decides whether to spend an exogenous (but ex ante random) innova-
tion cost. After incurring the cost, the invention arrives with some probability. At the
first stage, I assume that the basic invention will be created for sure when the pioneer-
ing inventor spends the cost c0, which is distributed over [0,∞) with CDF F0(·) and
pdf f0(·). The basic invention has no stand-alone value, and the game ends when the
pioneer decides not to spend c0.
After the pioneer incurs c0, the game proceeds to the stage of application search.
The application has a private value pi > 0 and exists with a probability α ∈ (0, 1].
The expected value is v ≡ αpi. These parameters are common knowledge between
two inventors. Given existence, the pioneer (the follower) finds the application after
incurring a cost c1 ∈ [0,∞) (c2 ∈ [0,∞), respectively). Denote the CDF and pdf of
cost ci as Fi(·) and fi(·), respectively, i ∈ {1, 2}. Suppose that pioneer searches first,
and the true cost ci is the player’s private information. An inventor cannot commit to
her/his own nor observe the other’s search strategy.
The distribution of search cost captures an inventor’s innovation capacity. I as-
sume that Fi as well as fi are continuous and differentiable as necessary, i ∈ {0, 1, 2}.
In addition, for all i ∈ {0, 1, 2}, fi(c) > 0 for 0 ≤ c < Ci, with Ci > v. This guarantees
that 0 < Fi(v) < 1, and so even if an inventor can grab the whole expected surplus,
from the ex ante point of view there is some probability that the inventor is not willing
to engage in innovation.
As in the literature of cumulative innovation, the patent policy affects the division
of surplus pi between inventors. To focus on the doctrine of patentable subject matter,
I assume that the application is patentable but always infringes on the basic invention
when the latter is protected by the patent rights. The only policy instrument is the
level of patent rights rewarded to the basic invention.
If the pioneer discovers the application, then she obtains a patent on the applica-
tion (and maybe also one on the basic invention); she enjoys the whole surplus pi. If
the follower makes the discovery, then patent policy determines that the pioneer re-
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ceives θpi and the follower receives (1− θ)pi, where θ ∈ [0, θ] and θ < 1. A higher θ
then implies stronger patent rights endowed to the basic invention, and the doctrine
of the patentable subject matter corresponds to the case of θ = 0. The upper bound
θ is assumed to be strictly less than one because generally, in case of mutual blocking
patents, each patent-holder would receive a share of surplus. In other words, I ex-
clude the extreme case where the pioneering inventor has the full bargaining power.
Note that, if the pioneer exhausts her search opportunity but does not come up
with the application, i.e, if she decides not to spend c1 or if c1 is incurred but she
doesn’t find the application, then the pioneer is (weakly) better off to disclose the
basic invention, for all values of patent policy θ. When the DPSM is enabled and the
basic invention is not patentable (θ = 0), then whether the pioneer discloses the basic
invention has no impact on her payoff. She won’t get a share of pi whatever happens
after.10 When the basic invention is patentable with θ > 0, by disclosing the basic
invention and so allow the follower to engage in application search, the pioneer may
receive a surplus θpi with some probability. Since there is no harm of disclosing the
basic invention, I assume that the pioneer will always publish the basic invention.
The optimal policy θ is derived to induce technological progress, as measured by
the overall probability to complete the two-stage innovation process.11 This objec-
tive can also be justified from the concern of the social surplus. When the application
has significant positive externality, private parties always under-invest. It is socially
desirable to raise private innovation efforts in order to achieve the application.
Figure 1 illustrates the timing of the game.
• At time 0, the patent policy θ is announced;
• at time 1, the pioneer learns the patent policy and the cost c0 of conducting the
first stage innovation. The game continues only if the inventor spends c0 and
creates the basic invention;
• at time 2, the pioneer inventor learns c1 and decides whether to search the ap-
plication;
• at time 2.5, the pioneer applies patents for the basic invention (if allowed), and
for the application (if she finds it); and
• at time 3, if the pioneer doesn’t find the application, then the follower learns his
10But after disclosure of the basic invention the pioneer may receive, say, a Nobel Prize or other
reputation-based reward from the scientific community for the recognition as the inventor of important
scientific knowledge or breakthrough.
11In Section 4, I show that the DPSM cannot maximize the joint surplus of the two inventors.
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Figure 1: Timing
search cost c2 and decides whether to search.
When the pioneering inventor holds a patent on the basic invention but doesn’t
find the application, the following inventor may want to negotiate a license before
searching for the application. I postpone the discussion of licensing between time 2.5
and time 3 to Section 5.
3 The DPSM and Stage-wise Innovation Performance
This section evaluates the impact of patent policy θ on the innovation process. Solving
the game in the backward manner, suppose that the pioneer has created the basic
invention, and consider the subgame of application search.
If the pioneer incurs c1 and finds the application, then she can patent the ap-
plication (and maybe the basic invention) and gets the whole surplus pi; the game
ends. Suppose that the pioneering inventor does not come up with the application,
either because she doesn’t spend c1 to search, or because she incurs c1 but the appli-
cation does not exist. By assumption, the follower cannot distinguish between the
two events.12 After learning his search cost c2, the follower decides whether to search
with some updated belief αˆ that the application exists. Below I will show that, for
both players, the optimal search strategy takes a cut-off form. That is, an inventor will
incur the search cost if and only if it is lower than a threshold value. Given this rule,
when the follower believes that the pioneer’s cut-off is c˜1, his updated belief is
αˆ(c˜1) =
α[1− F1(c˜1)]
1− α + α[1− F1(c˜1)]
=
α[1− F1(c˜1)]
1− αF1(c˜1)
. (1)
With probability α, the application exists, and the pioneer finds it only if incurring
the cost c1; and with probability 1− α, the application does not exist and the pioneer-
12If the pioneer has incurred search cost but failed to find the application, by assumption it is a clear
indication that the application does not exist. This “negative information” is valuable to the follower as
well as the society for it prevents further wasteful search effort. See 5 for a discussion of “licensing” this
information.
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ing inventor won’t be able to find it whether spending c1 or not. The follower then
updates his belief according to Bayes’ rule as expressed in condition (1).
Given the patent policy θ ∈ [0, θ], the follower receives a payoff (1− θ)pi for his
discovery. He incurs c2 and searches if and only if
αˆpi(1− θ)− c2 ≥ 0 ⇒ c2 ≤ cˆ2 ≡ αˆpi(1− θ). (2)
The follower adopts a cut-off rule, with an expected payoff (given that the pioneering
inventor doesn’t find the application)
Uˆ2 =
∫ cˆ2
0
[αˆpi(1− θ)− c2]dF2. (3)
For the pioneer, if she spends the cost c1, then with probability α she will find the
application and enjoy the whole surplus pi; and with probability 1− α the application
does not exist and the follower will not find it either. If the pioneer does not spend
c1, then she will receive a surplus θpi when the application exists and the follower
searches. Suppose that the pioneer believes that the follower adopts a cut-off c˜2 and
so will search with probability F2(c˜2). The pioneer searches if and only if
αpi − c1 ≥ F2(c˜2)αpiθ ⇒ c1 ≤ cˆ1 ≡ αpi[1− F2(c˜2)θ] = v[1− F2(c˜2)θ]. (4)
The pioneer also adopts a cut-off rule, and her expected payoff at the second-stage is
Uˆ1 =
∫ cˆ1
0
(αpi − c1)dF1 + [1− F1(cˆ1)]F2(c˜2)αpiθ. (5)
By assumption, players cannot commit to their search strategies, i.e., the cut-off
values. Since the true search cost and the decision to incur it are not observable to the
other party, the proper equilibrium concept at the search subgame is rational expecta-
tion equilibrium. Slightly abusing the notation, a rational expectation equilibrium is a
pair of cut-offs (cˆ1, cˆ2) such that they are determined according to conditions (2) and
(4), with the belief αˆ in condition (2) evaluated at c˜1 = cˆ1 according to the expression
(1), and the belief c˜2 = cˆ2 in condition (4). Given a search equilibrium (cˆ1, cˆ2), denote
the corresponding probabilities Fˆi ≡ Fi(cˆi), i ∈ {1, 2}. For the interest of this paper, I
denote (c∗1 , c
∗
2) as the search equilibrium under the DPSM, i.e., under the policy θ = 0,
with corresponding F∗i = Fi(c
∗
i ), i = 1, 2.
The DPSM guarantees a unique search equilibrium. Setting θ = 0 in condition
(4), the pioneer’s search decision is independent of the follower’s search strategy. The
optimal cut-off is uniquely determined by
c∗1 ≡ αpi ≡ v. (6)
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This unique cut-off then pins down the follower’s updated belief at search, αˆ(c∗1) ≡ α
∗,
and the follower’s optimal cut-off c∗2:
c∗2 ≡ α
∗pi. (7)
When θ > 0, the two inventors’ search decisions become strategic substitutes.
In equilibrium, a higher cut-off cˆ1 will reduce cˆ2, and vice versa. The pioneer, with
θ > 0, benefits from the follower’s search. More intensive search by the follower, i.e.,
a higher cut-off cˆ2 and so a larger probability Fˆ2, lowers the pioneer’s search incentive.
The pioneer’s cut-off cˆ1 is decreasing in cˆ2 for θ > 0.
The negative impact of cˆ1 on cˆ2 works through the belief αˆ. One event leading
to the follower’s search is the pioneer’s failure to find the application, which implies
that the application does not exist. The follower’s search opportunity, in other words,
conveys a bad news that the application is less likely to exist. This pessimisticmessage
becomes worse as the pioneer searches more intensively. For all α ∈ (0, 1), a higher cˆ1
by the pioneer reduces the follower’s belief at search:
∂αˆ
∂cˆ1
= −
α(1− α) f1(cˆ1)
[1− αF1(cˆ1)]2
< 0. (8)
A negative effect on belief depresses the follower’s search incentives: cˆ2 is decreasing
in cˆ1. As long as θ < 1, the patent policy only changes the magnitude of this effect,
but does not affect its presence.
Themutual dependence of search decisions may lead tomultiple search equilibria.
Consider an increase in cˆ1. Along the equilibrium path, a more intensive search from
the pioneer lowers the follower’s belief, and so the follower’s equilibrium cut-off cˆ2.
A lower search intensity from the follower in turn justifies the initial increase in cˆ1. By
the same token, expecting an increase of the follower’s cut-off, the pioneer will search
over a smaller range of search cost. The follower, along the equilibrium path, will a
have a higher updated belief, and so is willing to raise the cut-off.
Despite the possibility of multiple equilibria under θ ∈ (0, θ], granting patent
rights to the basic invention always reduces the pioneer’s search incentive, c∗1 > cˆ1
for all θ such that 0 < θ ≤ θ < 1. By θ < 1, in any search equilibrium cˆ2 > 0 and
so Fˆ2 > 0. It follows that c
∗
1 = v > cˆ1 = v(1− Fˆ2θ), for all θ ∈ (0, θ]. For the fol-
lower, a lower cut-off adopted by the pioneer boosts his belief at search: αˆ(cˆ1) > α
∗,
for all cˆ1 < c
∗
1 . Whether cˆ2 ≷ c
∗
2 then depends on whether αˆ(1 − θ) ≷ α
∗. In this
model, the negative effect of transferring surplus θpi from the follower to the pio-
neer on the former’s search incentive is mitigated by the opposite effect on the belief.
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Patent protection to the basic invention does not necessarily weaken the follower’s
search incentives.
Given the parameter α and search equilibrium (cˆ1, cˆ2), the probability to discover
the application is α[Fˆ1 + (1− Fˆ1)Fˆ2]. Define Eˆ ≡ Fˆ1 + (1− Fˆ1)Fˆ2, which measures the
overall search effort, or the innovation performance at the second stage. Define the
corresponding measure under the DPSM as E∗ ≡ F∗1 + (1− F
∗
1 )F
∗
2 . Since c
∗
1 > cˆ1, the
comparison between E∗ and Eˆ depends on the relative size of c∗2 and cˆ2. If c
∗
2 ≥ cˆ2,
then the DPSM surely boosts the second-stage innovation performance, E∗ > Eˆ. If
cˆ2 >> c
∗
2 , however, we may have the opposite outcome, Eˆ > E
∗. Different from
Aoki and Nagaoka (2004), in my model patent protection to the basic invention is not
necessarily detrimental to the second stage innovation performance. The following
example use two-point search technology to illustrate this point, as well as the possi-
bility of multiple search equilibria.
Example 1. (Two-point search technology). Suppose that both the pioneer’s and fol-
lower’s search cost have two-point distributions, ci ∈ {Ci,K}, with K > v ≥ Ci ≥ 0,
and the probability of low search cost is Pr(ci = Ci) = pi ∈ (0, 1), i = 1, 2. An inven-
tor will not incur the high search cost K > v. In any search equilibrium, the pioneer’s
(follower’s) search probability is at most Fˆ1 = p1 (Fˆ2 = p2, respectively).
Fixing θ > 0, I first show that both (Fˆ1, Fˆ2) = (0, p2) and (p1, 0) can be search equi-
libria. To have (0, p2) as the equilibrium, the pioneer must find it too costly to incur
C1, given that the following inventor will incur C2. We need C1 > v(1− p2θ). And
for the follower to be willing to incur C2, given that the pioneering inventor does not
search at all, we need C2 ≤ v(1− θ). In this search equilibrium, the follower’s belief
maintains at the ex ante level. For (p1, 0) to be the search equilibrium, the pioneer in-
curs C1 but the follower will not search. We need C1 ≤ v and C2 > αˆpi(1− θ), where
αˆ = α(1− p1)/(1− αp1) < α. We have multiple equilibria when
v(1− p2θ) < C1 ≤ v and αˆpi(1− θ) < C2 ≤ v(1− θ). (9)
An implication of multiple equilibria is mis-allocation of search activity. Even
though the overall search performance is the same, different equilibria may entail
different levels of total search cost. To see this, suppose p1 = p2 = p ∈ (0, 1) and con-
dition (9) holds. Both search equilibria have the same probability to find the applica-
tion (given existence), Eˆ = p, but different search costs depending on which inventor
searches. When C1 > C2, then the equilibrium where only the follower searches is
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more cost-efficient. In fact, if p2 > p1, then this equilibrium also has a higher proba-
bility to find the application.
Lastly, suppose that p2 > p1. Under the DPSM (θ = 0), the search equilibrium is
unique, (p1, 0), with E
∗ = p1. But if we let the basic invention be patentable with θ > 0
such that condition (9) holds, then in the search equilibrium (0, p2), we have Eˆ = p2 >
E∗. Patenting the basic invention boosts the second stage innovation performance
when the “good” search equilibrium prevails. ‖
The following proposition summarizes the results at the second stage.
Proposition 1. (Search equilibrium). When θ ∈ (0, θ] and α ∈ (0, 1), there may be multiple
search equilibria at the second innovation stage. But the search equilibrium is unique under
the DPSM.
The pioneer has a higher search incentive under the DPSM than under other policy θ ∈
(0, θ], c∗1 > cˆ1. The impact of the patent policy on the follower’s search incentive is ambiguous,
c∗2 ≷ cˆ2. Consider stable search equilibria. When evaluated at θ = 0, dcˆ1/dθ < 0. For θ > 0,
dEˆ/dθ ≷ 0, but not both dcˆ1/dθ and dcˆ2/dθ > 0.
Remark 1. (Market structure). An important difference between my model and the
analytical framework adopted by Aoki and Nagaoka (2004) is the effect of the patent
policy θ on the “market structure” of the innovationmarket. Aoki and Nagaoka (2004)
uses a two-stage patent race model from Denicolo` (2000) and also allows the first
inventor to engage in the second stage innovation.13 Due to the assumptions of a
homogeneous Poisson race and identical research capability, if the basic invention is
patentable, the patent-holder has no incentive to let other inventors pursue the second
stage innovation. The only meaningful policy space is a binary set, namely, whether
the basic invention is patentable or not. The pioneer does not benefit from other in-
ventor’s innovation capacity. Patenting the basic invention generates a monopoly at
the second stage, and increases the concentration of the innovation activity, i.e., the
extent to which different inventions are created by different inventors.
By contrast, I have a “hybrid” structure where the pioneer enjoys head-start ad-
vantage at the second stage and at the same time could extract some surplus from
the follower when the basic invention is patentable and her search fails. My model
has a richer policy space θ ∈ [0, θ], and can easily incorporate asymmetric innova-
tion capacities by different inventors, as captured by different distributions F1 and
13They assume free entry at the first stage. The “pioneer,” therefore, refers to the first inventor to finish
the race and create the basic invention (or the intermediate technology as they called it).
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F2. In addition, granting the patent protection to the basic invention may reduce the
concentration of the innovation market. Given that the second stage innovation is
completed, the probability that it is finished by the follower is [(1− F∗1 )F
∗
2 ]/E
∗ when
the basic invention is not patentable, and [(1 − Fˆ1)Fˆ2]/Eˆ when it is patentable with
θ > 0. Compare the two levels,
(1− Fˆ1)Fˆ2
Eˆ
>
(1− F∗1 )F
∗
2
E∗
⇔ F∗1 (1− Fˆ1)Fˆ2 > Fˆ1(1− F
∗
1 )F
∗
2 . (10)
Since F∗1 > Fˆ1, as long as Fˆ2 is not too small relative to F
∗
2 , patenting the basic invention
helps the decentralization of innovation activities. ‖
Remark 2. (Impact of α). Fixing the expected value v, the level of the parameter α
captures how “abstract” the basic invention is, or how far it is from commercial ap-
plications. A lower α means that it is more difficult to find or develop the application,
although the expected value is not affected. In the proof of Proposition 1, I show that
a higher α does not necessarily raise the overall second stage performance. Given
the pioneer’s search strategy, a higher α will raise the follower’s belief αˆ and increase
his incentive to search, dcˆ2/dα > 0. When θ > 0, this boost in the follower’s search
intensity provides a negative feedback to the pioneer’s search decision, dcˆ1/dα < 0,
for she can free ride on the follower’s search result. The overall impact on the second
stage performance Eˆ is ambiguous, and may be negative when the pioneer has better
search capacity than the follower. For instance, when c1 and c2 have uniform distri-
butions over [0,γ1v] and [0,γ2v], respectively, with γ1 and γ2 > 1, then dEˆ/dα < 0
for γ1 < 1+ θ and γ2 large enough. ‖
Turn to the first stage. Expecting a payoffU1 from the search subgame, the pioneer
will incur a cost c0 to create the basic invention as long as c0 ≤ U1. The basic inven-
tion will be produced with a probability F0(U1), and a higher U1 raises the pioneer’s
incentive to engage in basic research. The pioneer’s expected payoff at the first stage
is
Uˆ0 =
∫ U1
0
(U1− c0)dF0. (11)
Denote Uˆ1 and U
∗
1 as the pioneer’s payoffs in the search equilibrium when θ ∈
(0, θ] and θ = 0, respectively. By previous discussion, c∗1 > cˆ1 and cˆ2 > 0. Together
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with the definition of cˆ1,
U∗1 =
∫ c∗1
0
(v− c1)dF1 =
∫ cˆ1
0
(v− c1)dF1 +
∫ c∗1
cˆ1
(v− c1)dF1
<
∫ cˆ1
0
(v− c1)dF1 +
∫ c∗1
cˆ1
Fˆ2vθdF1 < Uˆ1 =
∫ cˆ1
0
(v− c1)dF1 + (1− Fˆ1)Fˆ2vθ.
(12)
As in the standard cumulative innovation literature, denying patent protection to the
basic invention reduces the pioneer’s first stage incentive. The DPSM imposes a cost
of harming the basic innovation.
Proposition 2. (First stage innovation incentives). Granting patent protection to the basic
invention increases the pioneer’s incentive to engage in basic research.
4 When to Impose the DPSM?
Considering the impact on both innovation stages, when is it optimal to impose the
DPSM? Using the overall technology progress rate, F0(Uˆ1)αEˆ, as the policy criterion, I
am interested in situations where θ = 0 is the solution to the programmaxθ αF0(Uˆ1)Eˆ.
Fixing α, it is equivalent to finding conditions such that F0(U∗1 )E
∗ ≥ F0(Uˆ1)Eˆ for all
θ ∈ (0, θ].
By previous analysis, U∗1 < Uˆ1 and so the DPSM is detrimental to the first stage
innovation incentive. If, at the second stage, E∗ < Eˆ for some θ ∈ (0, θ], then the
DPSM is dominated at both stages of the innovation process. A necessary condition
to reject patent protection to the basic invention therefore is Eˆ < E∗ for all θ ∈ (0, θ].
Suppose that this necessary condition holds. That is, the indirect effect of θ > 0 on the
follower’s belief, αˆ(cˆ1) > α
∗, is not large enough to dominate the sum of the effect on
the pioneer’s search decision (c∗1 > cˆ1) and the direct effect on the follower’s search
incentive due to surplus transfer.
Consider the overall impact of the patent policy on the technological progress:
dF0(Uˆ1)Eˆ
dθ
= Eˆ f0(Uˆ1)
dUˆ1
dθ
+ F0(Uˆ1)
dEˆ
dθ
=Eˆ f0(1− Fˆ1)v
(
Fˆ2 + θ fˆ2
dcˆ2
dθ
)
+ F0(1− Fˆ1)(1− Fˆ2)
(
fˆ1
1− Fˆ1
dcˆ1
dθ
+
fˆ2
1− Fˆ2
dcˆ2
dθ
)
=(1− Fˆ1)
[
Eˆ f0v
(
Fˆ2 + θ fˆ2
dcˆ2
dθ
)
+ F0(1− Fˆ2)
(
fˆ1
1− Fˆ1
dcˆ1
dθ
+
fˆ2
1− Fˆ2
dcˆ2
dθ
)]
.
(13)
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In my model, the patent policy affects three decisions: besides the pioneer’s innova-
tion decision at the first stage and the follower’s decision at the second stage, it also
affects the pioneer’s incentive at the second stage. The cumulative innovation litera-
ture, such as Green and Scotchmer (1995), emphasizes the trade-off between different
generations of inventors at different innovation stages, but overlooks the same inven-
tor’s innovation incentives across stages. As shown in Section 3, a patent on the basic
invention encourages the first stage innovation (F0(Uˆ1) > F0(U
∗
1 )) and changes the
follower’s innovation performance (dcˆ2/dθ ≷ 0). This early reward also discourages
the pioneer from continuing her research activity (Fˆ1 < F
∗
1 ). When this effect is strong
enough, we may find a reason to reject patenting the basic invention.
To better illustrate the key result, I make a few simplifications on the cost distri-
butions. Suppose that c0 follows the uniform distribution over the support [0,γ0v],
with γ0 > 1, and c2 follows the two-point distribution, c2 ∈ {0,K}, with K > v and
Pr(c2 = 0) = p2 ∈ (0, 1). The first simplification brings about an interesting case
where the optimal policy θ is independent of the cost parameter at the first stage,
namely, γ0. Different from Aoki and Nagaoka (2004), within the class of uniform dis-
tributions, I can derive the optimality of the DPSM without referring to the difficulty
of obtaining the basic invention. The two-point search technology, c2 ∈ {0,K}, im-
plies that the follower has a fixed probability Fˆ2 = F∗2 = p2 to find the application.
The second simplification is introduced to point out how the follower’s capacity p2
affects the trade-off between the pioneer’s innovation incentives at different stages.14
Under these specifications, dcˆ2/dθ = 0 and dcˆ1/dθ = −vp2. Fixing the follower’s
search capacity, stronger patent protection to the basic invention θ always raises the
pioneer’s incentive to engage in basic invention. By integration by parts and the opti-
14Suppose that, instead, the pioneer has a fixed search capacity, c1 ∈ {0,K}with Pr(c1 = 0) = p1 ∈ [0, 1).
The optimal θ then is determined according to the classical trade-off between different inventor’s incentives
at different stages. (When p1 = 0, it corresponds to the standard model where different generations of
innovations are conducted by different players.) By dcˆ1/dθ = 0 and so dcˆ2/dθ = −vφ, where φ = (1−
Fˆ1)/(1− αFˆ1),
sign
(
dF0(Uˆ1)Eˆ
dθ
)
= sign
(
f0
F0
[p1 + (1− p1)Fˆ2](Fˆ2 − θφ fˆ2)− fˆ2φ
)
. (14)
If both f0 and f2 take uniform distributions, the sign of dF0(Uˆ1)Eˆ/dθ, when evaluated at θ = 0, is the same
as
1
p1v
[p1 + (1− p1)F
∗
2 ]−
φ
φv
=
1
v
(
1+
1− p1
p1
F∗2 − 1
)
> 0. (15)
The DPSM is never optimal.
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mal cut-off cˆ1 = v(1− Fˆ2θ) = v(1− p2θ),
Uˆ1 =
∫ cˆ1
0
(v− c1)dF1 + (1− Fˆ1)p2vθ = (v− c1)F(c1)|
cˆ1
0 +
∫ cˆ1
0
F1dc1 + (1− Fˆ1)p2vθ
=
∫ cˆ1
0
F1dc1 + p2vθ,
(16)
and so
dUˆ1
dθ
= Fˆ1
dcˆ1
dθ
+ p2v = (1− Fˆ1)p2v > 0, when Fˆ1 < 1. (17)
This positive effect, however, comes at a cost of lower second stage innovation per-
formance,
dEˆ
dθ
= (1− p2) fˆ1
dcˆ1
dθ
= −(1− p2) fˆ1p2v < 0. (18)
The term p2v appear in both dUˆ1/dθ and dEˆ/dθ. Raising patent protection to the
basic invention directly affects the surplus transfer from the follower to the pioneer.
Its impact is proportional to the follower’s expected return from search, which is p2v
in this case. Beyond this common factor, we can see that the positive effect on the
first stage innovation is also proportional to 1− Fˆ1, the probability that the pioneer
finds the application (given existence). For the pioneer will use the patent on the ba-
sic invention to get a share of the follower’s search surplus only when her search fails.
On the other hand, the negative impact on the second stage innovation is also propor-
tional to 1− p2, namely, a lower search effort from the pioneer becomes amore serious
problem when the follower is less likely to make the discovery. Combining the two
factors, it might be optimal to maintain the DPSM when the pioneer has significant
search capacity (and so Fˆ1 is high for all θ ∈ [0, θ]), but not the follower (and so p2 is
small).
Under the specified distributions of c0 and c2, the sign of the first-order condition,
dF0(Uˆ1)Eˆ/dθ, is the same as
Eˆ(1− Fˆ1)− Uˆ1(1− p2) fˆ1. (19)
The first term, Eˆ(1 − Fˆ1), captures the incentive effect of an increase in θ on the
pioneer’s willingness to engage in the first stage research, Uˆ1. The second term,
Uˆ1(1− p2) fˆ1, is associated with the effect of θ on the pioneer’s second stage decision
cˆ1. If the expression (19) is negative for all θ ∈ [0, θ], then the DPSM is the optimal
policy.
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To illustrate how the optimality of the DPSM is determined by the pioneer’s search
capacity, let’s assume that c1 also has uniform distribution over the support [0,γ1v],
with γ1 > 1. When γ1 is smaller, the support of c1 shrinks, the pioneer is more likely to
have smaller search cost. Fixing cˆ1, the pioneer is more likely tomake the discovery, Fˆ1
is decreasing in γ1. This parameter also affects the density function f1(c1) = 1/γ1v.
A reduction in γ1 increases f1, provided that c1 ∈ [0,γ1v], which in turn magnifies
the negative impact of θ on Fˆ1 and thus Eˆ. A lower γ1, then, implies a better search
capacity by the pioneer, and so the more likely to find the DPSM optimal.
After some calculation,
Uˆ1 =
v
2γ1
[
1+ 2(γ1 − 1)θp2 + (θp2)
2
]
. (20)
The sign of the first-order condition is the same as
2(γ1 − 1)[(γ1 − 1)p2 + 1]− (1− p2)− 3(1− p2)(p2θ)
2
+2p2θ[(γ1 − 1)p2 + 1− 2(γ1 − 1)(1− p2)].
(21)
When γ1 → 1
+ and p2 → 0, the first-order condition is strictly negative for all θ ∈
[0, θ]. The DPSM is the optimal policy. In the proof of the following proposition, I
consider the case where c2 also has a uniform distribution, f2 = 1/(γ2v), with γ2 > 1.
In this case, p2 is no more fixed, but the DPSM is optimal when γ2 is large enough
and γ1 small enough. As the pioneer’s search capacity expands, but the follower’s
capacity shrinks, denying patent protection to the basic invention is more likely to be
optimal.
Proposition 3. To promote the technology progress, a necessary condition for the DPSM to be
the optimal policy is that it encourages the overall efforts to search the application, E∗ > Eˆ,
for all θ > 0.
Suppose that ci following uniform distribution, fi = 1/(γiv), with γi > 1, i ∈ {0, 1, 2}.
The DPSM is an optimal policy when γ1 is small enough and γ2 is large enough.
In light of this result, the DPSM should be applied, and the basic invention should
not be patentable when the pioneer has superior technology at the subsequent re-
search stage, but not the follower. But where does this persistence of innovation dom-
inance come from? One source of this advantage would be some knowledge the pio-
neer acquired during the first stage. The follower cannot benefit from this knowledge
either because of its tacit nature and so the intrinsic difficulty to transfer among dif-
ferent inventors, or the pioneer’s unwillingness to disclose and help the follower to
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understand this knowledge. The former in turn may relate to the landscape of the
research environment, for instance, how easily it would be for a late-comer to digest
the knowledge required to effectively participation in the innovation process. To the
extent that, at its nascent phase, the background information of a field may not be
widely distributed, but rather concentrated on very few key players, there may not
be many capable followers who can readily pursue the pioneer’s research line. The
insight of Proposition 3 suggests that patents shouldn’t be granted to basic inventions
in order to maintain the pioneer’s continuation effort. The latter, on the other hand,
may depend on the disclosure requirement of the patent law. That is, when weak
disclosure or enablement requirements significantly hampers other parties’ ability to
exploit the patented technology, the patent should not be granted. Although it is a
common argument that patent system should be designed to diffuse technology, the
reasoning here is based on a somewhat reason, namely, the pioneer’s incentive to
continue doing research.
Another factor that would affect the pioneer’s and follower’s chance to develop
the application are their commercialization capacity. Although the model is devel-
oped as a two-stage innovation process, the second stage can be equivalently inter-
preted as one that involves not research, but commercialization activity. A party is
more likely to successfully commercialize the basic invention if, say, she controls more
key physical assets used to develop useful and marketable application. The assump-
tion that the second stage result is patentable then corresponds to the protection to
(tangible) property rights. And the condition identified in Proposition 3 implies that
the patentability of basic invention hinges on the degree of vertical integration. It
should not be patentable when the upstream pioneer extends her dominance to the
downstream stage of commercialization.
Remark 3. (Research grants). Basic research is often funded by research grants. The
main advantage of monetary rewards, it is often argued, is to avoid monopolization
of fundamental knowledge. Our analysis, however, indicates that monopoly rights
over basic innovation do not necessarily hinder subsequent innovation. By the same
logic, monetary rewards, instead of patent rights, to the pioneer’s basic inventionmay
deteriorate rather than enhance the overall performance of subsequent innovation. ‖
Remark 4. (Alternative objective). This remark considers another objective function,
namely, the joint surplus between the two inventors. It turns out that setting θ = 0
will not maximize the joint surplus. In the search of the optimality of the DPSM, this
18
justifies the use of technology progress as the policy objective.
Given the policy θ and the payoffs from the search subgame, Uˆ1 and Uˆ2, the joint
surplus is
S =
∫ Uˆ1
0
(Uˆ1− c0)dF0 + F0(Uˆ1)(1− αFˆ1)Uˆ2. (22)
Since the basic invention has no stand-alone value, when the pioneer is willing to
incur c0, she expects a payoff Uˆ1 from the subsequent subgame. And the follower gets
a payoff Uˆ2 only when the basic invention is created and the pioneer does not come
up with the application. In the proof of Proposition 4, I show that, when evaluating at
θ = 0, a marginal increase in θ always raises the joint surplus S. This result does not
need further restrictions on the distributions of innovation costs. Intuitively, raising θ
beyond zero only exerts a negative impact on the follower’s payoff Uˆ2. This negative
effect, however, is canceled by a positive impact on the pioneering inventor’s payoff
Uˆ1. Therefore, the DPSM cannot be justified with the inventor’s joint surplus as the
policy objective.
Proposition 4. Imposing the DPSM, i.e., setting θ = 0, does not maximize the joint surplus
of the two inventors. ‖
5 Extensions (to be completed)
 Licensing: When the pioneer holds a patent on the basic invention, the two par-
tiesmay negotiate a license between time 2.5 and 3.15 Licensing bargaining takes place
around two issues.
First, by limited liability, a license only contains a revenue-sharing rule between
the two parties, namely, the portion of pi transferred from the follower to the pioneer.
The patent protection θ may be too strong, for instance, in the extreme case of θ = 1,
the follower has no incentive to search; it may bemutually beneficial to a lower royalty
term, namely, the portion of pi transferred from the follower to the pioneer. This
concern justifies our restriction on the upper bound of patent protection, θ < 1, as the
range of protection that would matter along the equilibrium path, after taking into
account licensing.
15To the extent that pi reflects the maximal revenue from holding a patent on the application, there is no
benefit to license this patent.
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Second, the follower is interested in the pioneer’s private information, i.e., when
she has incurred the search cost at the second stage (time 2). By learning this informa-
tion, the follower can save on the search cost c2 if the pioneer has searched yet failed,
and in the case where the pioneer didn’t search, the follower can raise his belief αˆ to
the ex ante level α.
Consider the pioneer’s incentive to disclose her information.16 Suppose that the
pioneer does not incur the search cost at time 2. As long as she can get a stake from
the follower’s search result, e.g., when θ > 0, the pioneer has a strong incentive to
transmit this information to the follower in order to raise his belief and the search
effort.17 For the pioneerwho has spent the search cost and learned that the application
does not exist, she knows that the follower’s search is doomed to fail and so loses the
interests in the stake from the follower’s innovation activity. The pioneer is indifferent
to making (or accepting) an offer or not. By breaking this indifference in different
ways, the follower may or may not learn the pioneer’s private information.
The indifference, however, is not robust to some modifications of the model, e.g.,
if the pioneer may make mistakes in search.18 Suppose that with some probability
ε > 0 the pioneer fails to find the application even when it exists and the search cost
is spent. In this case, the pioneer’s failure is still a bad news, but not as desperate
as before, and the pioneer will retain some interests in the follower’s search activity.
The updated belief about the existence of the application, after the pioneer’s search
failure, is
αε =
εα
1− α + εα
. (23)
16When the true level of c1 is the pioneer’s private information andwhether she has spent this cost is non-
verifiable, it is unclear which patent policy tool could be used to encourage the pioneer to disclosure this
information. Since patents are public records, whenever the identity of following inventors are unknown
ex ante, it may be difficult to enforce patent rights that are granted to knowledge that is used to prevent some
activities from happening. A monetary reward might be useful, though. That is, the pioneering inventor
brings the hard evidence of spending c1 and receives a prize related to the follower’s expected saving. But
when the follower cannot be traced down to finance the monetary reward, we go beyond the scope of the
patent system and public funds become necessary. I do not consider how the patent system should be
designed to directly tackle this issue.
17When θ = 0, whether the pioneer is willing to reveal this information depends on the contracting
environment. For instance, if the pioneer makes the offer, then after learning the pioneer’s information
via license offering, the follower can simply turn down the offer and run away with the pioneer’s private
information. The Arrow problem applies here. But this strategy does not work when the follower makes
an enforceable offer to the pioneer.
18An alternative way is to relax the limited liability constraint and so the follower can purchase informa-
tion with cash, or if the follower’s saving on the search cost c2 is transferrable to the pioneer. The pioneer
may be able to “sell” her negative information in exchange for some rent from the follower. The question,
then, is whether this broader contracting space could help information transmission.
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For any ε ∈ (0, 1), 0 < αε < α. Denote the pioneer’s belief, or “type” as αP ∈ {α, αε}.
When the pioneer gets a share l from the follower’s successful search, her expected
payoff is
αPF2(α˜
l(1− l)pi)lpi, (24)
where αP ∈ {α, αε}, and the follower forms his belief at search, α˜l, according to the
contract term l (offered by the pioneer in the signaling model, or accepted by the pio-
neer in the screening model). Note that, apart from the first term, the pioneer’s own
belief αP affects her expected payoff only through its impact on the follower’s belief
α˜l via the contract term l. There, at the bargaining stage, the pioneer acts to maximize
F2(α˜l(1− l)pi)lpi, regardless of her type. The pioneer’s behavior is not affected by her
private information. It is then natural to select an equilibrium where both types of
pioneer take the same action and so the follower learns no new information, i.e., a
pooling equilibrium when the pioneer makes the offer, or no separation (bunching)
when the follower makes the offer.19 Once we restrict our attention to such equilibria,
then our previous analysis goes through.
 Endogenous search capacity:
 Endogenous order to search: In the basic model I let the pioneer search first.
An implicit assumption is that the pioneer can protect the basic invention under se-
crecy until her search fails, or until she decides not to search. This assumption cap-
tures some first-mover advantage and, more importantly, avoids the extreme situation
where the pioneer is “forced” to disclose the basic invention even if it is not patentable.
Here I consider whether the pioneer will exploit this advantage, or instead will want
to wait until after the follower’s search.
I keep the assumption that a player cannot observe the other’s true search cost nor
the decision to incur the cost, and that the pioneer still learns the trust cost at time 2,
but add an additional stage, time 4, where the pioneering inventor can spend her cost
c1 to search, if she hasn’t done that at time 2. For a policy θ ∈ [0, θ], denote cˆ1 and
cˆ2 as the equilibrium cut-offs without time 4. I derive conditions under which this
additional timing is irrelevant.
19When the pioneer makes the offer, by carefully structuring the follower’s off-path beliefs we may have
separating equilibria. However, in any such equilibrium both types of pioneer must be indifferent to the
two equilibrium offers.
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When endowed with this additional timing to search, the pioneer knows that if
she delays search, she will need to incur c1 only if the follower doesn’t come up with
an application. Similar to the reasoning in section 3, the pioneer can update her belief
about α at this event. The pioneer’s updated belief at time 4 is α · φˆ, where
φˆ =
1− F2(cˆ2)
1− αF2(cˆ2)
. (25)
Since the follower holds no claim again the pioneer, the latter will incur search at time
4 as long as c1 ≤ αφˆpi = φˆv. For c1 > φˆv, this additional timing to search is irrelevant.
Suppose that the pioneer has search cost c1 ≤ φˆv. If she searches at time 2, the
expected payoff is v− c1. If she delays to time 4, the expected payoff is
F2(cˆ2)θv+ [1− αF2(cˆ2)](φˆv− c1) = F2(cˆ2)θv+ [1− F2(cˆ2)]v− [1− αF2(cˆ2)]c1. (26)
When F2(cˆ2) > 0,
v− c1 ≥ F2(cˆ2)θv+ (1− F2(cˆ2))v− [1− αF2(cˆ2)]c1 ⇔ c1 ≤ (1− θ)pi. (27)
For c1 smaller than (1− θ)pi, the pioneer will search at time 2 rather than wait.
Compare the pioneer’s different thresholds. If
1− θ ≥ αφˆ = α
1− F2(cˆ2)
1− αF2(cˆ2)
⇒ θ ≤
1− α
1− αF2(cˆ2)
, (28)
then time 4 is irrelevant. The pioneer will even search at time 4 only for c1 ≤ αφˆpi. But
by 1− θ ≥ αφˆ, and so c1 ≤ (1− θ)pi, for this range of search cost the pioneer prefers
searching at time 2 than time 4.20 When α and θ are not too large, such that condition
(28) holds, previous results are robust to the pioneer’s endogenous search timing.
If condition (28) fails, then the search equilibrium is not robust to the pioneer’s
additional search opportunity. The pioneer will want to delay search for c1 ∈ ((1−
θ)pi, φˆv], and only spend c1 ≤ (1− θ)pi at time 2. The search equilibrium is character-
ized by three cut-offs: c′1 = (1− θ)pi, c
′
2 = αˆ(c
′
1)pi(1− θ), and c
′′
1 = φˆ(c
′
2)v, where
αˆ(c′1) =
α[1− F1(c
′
1)]
1− αF1(c′1)
and φˆ(c′2) =
1− F2(c′2)
1− αF2(c′2)
. (29)
That is, the pioneer adopts the cut-off c′1 at time 2, and cut-off c
′′
1 at time 4, and the
follower adopts cut-off c′2. The search equilibrium is unique, but the patent policy has
20The same condition also guarantees (1− θ)pi ≥ cˆ1 = αpi[1− θF2(cˆ2)], the cut-off obtained in section
3. That is, the additional time 4 expands the range of search cost the pioneer is willing to spend at time 2.
Time 4, again, is irrelevant.
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similar impact as before. An increase in θ will decrease c′1, and has a direct negative
impact on c′2. But a lower c
′
1 exerts a positive indirect effect on c
′
2 via the follower’s
belief αˆ. The net change in c′2, then, has an opposite effect on the pioneer’s second cut-
off c
′′
1 through φˆ. The overall impact on the search performance, again, is ambiguous.
6 Conclusion
In this paper, I provided a simple theory about the patentability of basic inventions.
I found both necessary conditions and a sufficient condition for the DPSM to be the
optimal policy. Necessary conditions, i.e., the strong externality of the application
and the DPSM’s positive effect on the second stage innovation, are derived in a fairly
general situation. The sufficient condition concerning the research capacities of the
pioneer and follower at the second stage, however, is obtained under specific cost
distributions. A future task is to test its robustness in more general settings.
A few other avenues for future research come to mind: multiple pioneers at the
first stage innovation as in Denicolo` (2000) and Aoki and Nagaoka (2004); secrecy pro-
tection to the basic invention; and the combination of the DPSM with other policy in-
struments, such as patent length and protection to second stage inventions, to name
a few. A better understanding of the doctrine of the patentable subject matter would
advance our knowledge on the optimal design of the patent system. This paper con-
stitutes an early step.
Appendix: Proofs
A Proofs
 Proposition 1
Proof. For the comparative static results, keep v ≡ αpi constant and denote φ ≡ (1−
Fˆ1)/(1− αFˆ1). Differentiate conditions (2) and (4):
dcˆ1 + θv fˆ2dcˆ2 = −vFˆ2dθ (30)
−(1− θ)v
∂φ
∂cˆ1
dcˆ1 + dcˆ2 = −vφdθ + (1− θ)v
∂φ
∂α
dα, (31)
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where
∂φ
∂cˆ1
= −
fˆ1(1− α)
(1− αFˆ1)2
≤ 0 and
∂φ
∂α
=
Fˆ1(1− Fˆ1)
(1− αFˆ1)2
> 0, (32)
with fˆi ≡ f (cˆi), i ∈ {1, 2}.
On the c1 − c2 plane, a stable equilibrium (cˆ1, cˆ2) requires that the pioneer’s reac-
tion curve have a larger slope (in absolute value) than the follower’s reaction curve.
That is,
∣∣∂cˆ2
∂cˆ1
∣∣
cˆ1
>
∣∣∂cˆ2
∂cˆ1
∣∣
cˆ2
⇔ △ ≡ 1+ θ(1− θ)v2 fˆ2
∂φ
∂cˆ1
= 1− θ(1− θ)v2
(1− α) fˆ1 fˆ2
(1− αFˆ1)2
> 0. (33)
Suppose that this is true.
By Cramer’s rule, the impact of an exogenous change in θ are
dcˆ1
dθ
=
v
△
(vθφ fˆ2 − Fˆ2) ≷ 0 and
dcˆ2
dθ
=
v
△
[−(1− θ)vFˆ2
∂φ
∂cˆ1
− φ] ≷ 0. (34)
When θ = 0, dcˆ1/dθ < 0. When θ > 0, if both terms are strictly positive,
21 then
vθφ fˆ2 > Fˆ2 >
φ
−v(1− θ)(∂φ/∂cˆ1)
, (35)
which contradicts the requirement of△ > 0.
The overall effect of θ on Eˆ is
dEˆ
dθ
= (1− Fˆ2) fˆ1
dcˆ1
dθ
+ (1− Fˆ1) fˆ2
dcˆ2
dθ
= (1− Fˆ1)(1− Fˆ2)
(
fˆ1
1− Fˆ1
dcˆ1
dθ
+
fˆ2
1− Fˆ2
dcˆ2
dθ
)
. (36)
The comparative static results with respect to α are
dcˆ1
dα
=
−(1− θ)v
△
vθ fˆ2
∂φ
∂α
< 0 and
dcˆ2
dα
=
(1− θ)v
△
∂φ
∂α
> 0. (37)
The impact on the overall search performance is
dEˆ
dα
= (1− Fˆ1)(1− Fˆ2)
(
fˆ1
1− Fˆ1
dcˆ1
dα
+
fˆ2
1− Fˆ2
dcˆ2
dα
)
= (1− Fˆ1)(1− Fˆ2)
(1− θ)v
△
∂φ
∂α
(
fˆ2
1− Fˆ2
−
fˆ1
1− Fˆ1
fˆ2θv
)
.
(38)
Under the DPSM, θ = 0, dE∗/dα > 0 for ∂φ/∂α > 0. When θ > 0, the sign of dEˆ/dα
depends on
fˆ2
1− Fˆ2
−
fˆ1
1− Fˆ1
fˆ2θv. (39)
21This excludes the case where α = 1 and so ∂φ/∂cˆ1 = 0.
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Suppose that c1 and c2 are distributed uniformly over [0,γ1v] and [0,γ2v], respec-
tively. In this case, given that cˆ1 = v(1− Fˆ2θ) and cˆ2 = vφ(1− θ),
fˆ2
1− Fˆ2
=
1/(γ2v)
1− [cˆ2/(γ2v)]
=
1
v[γ2 − φ(1− θ)]
,
fˆ1
1− Fˆ1
=
1
v[γ1 − 1+ Fˆ2θ],
(40)
and so
fˆ2
1− Fˆ2
−
fˆ1
1− Fˆ1
fˆ2θv =
1
v
[
1
γ2− (1− θ)φ
−
θ
γ2(γ1− 1+ Fˆ2θ)
]
. (41)
The sign of dEˆ/dα at θ > 0 is determined by
γ2(γ1− 1+ Fˆ2θ)− θ[γ2 − (1− θ)φ] = γ2[γ1 − (1+ θ)] + γ2θ
φ(1− θ)v
γ2v
+ φθ(1− θ)
= γ2[γ1 − (1+ θ)] + 2φθ(1− θ) ≤ γ2[γ1 − (1+ θ)] +
1
2
,
(42)
for φ ≤ 1 and θ(1− θ) ≤ 1/4. Therefore, given any θ > 0, dEˆ/dα < 0 for γ1 < 1+ θ
and γ2 large enough. Q.E.D.
 Proposition 3
Proof. When all three cost components have uniform distributions, but different sup-
ports, the objective function is F0(Uˆ1)αEˆ = [α/(γ0v)]Uˆ1Eˆ. Finding the analytical so-
lutions of Uˆ1 and Eˆ, the relevant part of the objective function is
Uˆ1Eˆ =
v
2γ21
[
1+ 2θFˆ2(γ1 − 1) + θ
2 Fˆ22
] [
1+ (γ1− 1)Fˆ2 − θFˆ2(1− Fˆ2)
]
, (43)
where Fˆ2 = cˆ2/(γ2v) = φ(1 − θ)/γ2. Ignoring v/(2γ21), the objective function is
proportional to
1+ (γ1− 1)Fˆ2 + θFˆ2
{
[1+ (γ1− 1)Fˆ2][2(γ1 − 1) + θFˆ2]−
(1− Fˆ2)[1+ 2(γ1 − 1)θFˆ2]− θ
2 Fˆ22 (1− Fˆ2)
}
.
(44)
The DPSM is optimal if the whole term is decreasing in θ, for all θ > 0. According to
the comparative static results in Proposition 1, under uniform distribution,
dcˆ2
dθ
= −
v
△
[
φ + (1− θ)vFˆ2
∂φ
∂cˆ1
]
= −φ
v
△
[
1+
v
γ2
(1− θ)2
∂φ
∂cˆ1
]
, (45)
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which is negative when γ2 large enough, for |∂φ/∂cˆ1| ≤ fˆ1/(1− α) < ∞ as long as
α < 1. (If α = 1, then φ = 1, a constant.) By fˆ1 = 1/(γ1v),
1+
v
γ2
(1− θ)2
∂φ
∂θ
≥ 1−
v
γ2
(1− θ)2
(1− α)γ1v
. (46)
When γ2 is large enough such that γ2 > 1/[(1 − α)γ1] ≥ (1 − θ)
2/[(1 − α)γ1], an
increase in θ will reduce cˆ2 and so (γ1 − 1)Fˆ2.
Consider the whole term associated with θFˆ2. It is negative for all θ as long as both
γ1 − 1 and Fˆ2 are small enough. For instance, if γ1 − 1 is close to zero, it becomes
θFˆ2− (1− Fˆ2)− θ2 Fˆ22 (1− Fˆ2) < 2Fˆ2− 1− θ
2 Fˆ22 (1− Fˆ2), by θ ≤ θ < 1. When γ2 is large
enough such that Fˆ2 ≤ v/(γ2v) ≤ 1/2, it is strictly negative. Or, if γ1− 1 = 1/4, then,
since θ ≤ θ < 1,
[1+ (γ1− 1)Fˆ2][2(γ1 − 1) + θFˆ2]− (1− Fˆ2)[1+ 2(γ1 − 1)θFˆ2]
=−
1
2
+
3θ
4
Fˆ22 + (
9
8
+
θ
2
)Fˆ2 < −
1
2
+
3
4
Fˆ22 +
13
8
Fˆ2,
(47)
which is strictly negative if γ2 is large enough such that Fˆ2 is smaller than, say, 1/8.
Q.E.D.
 Proposition 4
Proof. The impact of the policy θ on the total surplus is
dS
dθ
= F0(Uˆ1)
dUˆ1
dθ
+ (1− αFˆ1) f0(Uˆ1)Uˆ2
dUˆ1
dθ
− F0(Uˆ1)
[
α fˆ1Uˆ2
dcˆ1
dθ
− (1− αFˆ1)
dUˆ2
dθ
]
. (48)
By the envelope theorem, the direct effect of θ on an inventor’s choice variable can be
ignored:
dUˆ1
dθ
=
∂Uˆ1
∂cˆ2
dcˆ2
dθ
+
∂Uˆ1
∂θ
= (1− Fˆ1)v
[
Fˆ2 + θ fˆ2
dcˆ2
dθ
]
, (49)
dUˆ2
dθ
=
∂Uˆ2
∂cˆ1
dcˆ1
dθ
+
∂Uˆ2
∂θ
= Fˆ2v
[
(1− θ)
∂φ
∂cˆ1
∂cˆ1
∂θ
− φ
]
. (50)
At θ = 0, dUˆ1/dθ = (1− Fˆ1)Fˆ2v > 0. By the comparative static results in the proof of
Proposition 1, dcˆ1/dθ = −Fˆ2v < 0. When θ = 0, the only negative term in dS/dθ is
the one associated with φ in dUˆ2/dθ, i.e.,
F0(Uˆ1)(1− αFˆ1)(−Fˆ2vφ) = −F0(Uˆ1)(1− Fˆ1)Fˆ2v, (51)
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which is exactly canceled by the first term in dS/dθ, for
F0(Uˆ1)
dUˆ1
dθ
∣∣
θ=0
= F0(Uˆ1)(1− Fˆ1)Fˆ2v. (52)
Therefore, dS/dθ > 0 at θ = 0. Q.E.D.
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